A comparative analysis of East and West German labor markets before and after unification by Krueger, Alan B. & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Krueger, Alan B.; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen
Working Paper
A comparative analysis of East and
West German labor markets before and
after unification
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 92-11
Provided in cooperation with:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Suggested citation: Krueger, Alan B.; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (1992) : A comparative analysis of
East and West German labor markets before and after unification, ZEW Discussion Papers, No.
92-11, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29360Discussion
Paper
Discussion Paper No 92-11
A Comparative Analysis of East
and West German Labor Markets








Human Resources SeriesA Comparative Analysis of East and West German Labor Markets
Before and After Unification
Alan B. Krueger
Princeton University and NBER
Jorn-Steffen Pischke
Zentrum fiir Europiiische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
August 1992
Abstract
~is paper uses micro data to analyze the wage structUres in East Germany and West
_.Germany-before·· and after unification. In 1988, the wage distribution in East
Germany was much more compressed than in West Germany or in the U.S. Since
the collapse ofCommunism and unification with West Germany, howevt:?r, the wage
structure in eastt?rn Germany has changed considerably. In particular, wage variation
has increased, the payoff to education has decreased slightly, industry differentials
have expanded, and the white collar premium has increased. Although average wage
growth has been remarkably high in eastern Germany, individual variation in wage
growth is similarto typical western levels. The wage structure ofeastGermans who
work in west Germany resembles the wage structure ofnative west Germans in some
respects, but the experience-earnings profile is flat. L
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Robert Topel for helpful comments.The unificatiOliofEast and West Gennany provides a unique natural experiment
to study a Soviet-style labor market undergoing a dramatic and rapid transition.
Furthennore, the demise of the Communist regime in East Gennany has enabled
researchers to obtain large quantities ofdata collected during the Communistera for
the first time. The availability of these data sets pennits a detailed comparison of
the operation of the labor market under.different economic systems. In this paper
we use several large micro data sets to compare the labor markets in East and West
Gennany before and after unification.
Specifically, we address the following questions: v How did the income
distributions compare in East and West Gennany just before the collapse of East
Gennany? What factors detennined wages in these countries? How has the
transfonnation to a market-based economy affected the income distribution ineastern
Gennany? How do fonner East Gennans who commute to work in west Gennany
or migrated to west Gennany perfonn in the labor market? To provide another point
of comparison for the wage structures, we also examine data for the U.S.
A number ofobservers have noted that East Genn~ physical capital is oflittle or
no value. The main asset acquired by West Gennany from unification is human ~
capital. We therefore devote a great deal of attention to comparing educational
levels and the value of education in East and West Gennany.
Our main conclusion is that East Gennans were well educated and received a
substantial payoff to their education. Indeed, despite greater wage compression in
East Gennany, the rate of return to education was about the same in East and West
Gennany in 1988. After unification, the return to education fell slightly in eastern
Gennany. East Gennans who commute to work in the west, have performed fairly
well in the capitalist economy. Western unions have tried to impose a wage
structure and bargaining structure on eastern Gennany that mimics the western
model. In some respects, we find that the wage structure of fonner East Gennany
is gradually approaching that ofWest Gennany. Most significantly, wage dispersion
has increased in eastern Gennany, especially at the right-tail of\the distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a brief summary ofrelevant
institutional features of the East and West Gennan labor markets and educational
systems. Section IT describes the data sets we use. Section ill presents an
international comparison of the wage structures in East. Gennany, West Gennany,
and the U.S., with particular emphasis on comparing the rate ofreturn to schooling.
Section IV examines changes that have taken place in the eastern Gennan labor
market since unification.
1I. Labor Market Institutions
West Germany (FRG)
Collective bargaining is an ·essentiallabor market institution in West Gennanyl).
Gennan unions are generally organized nationwide along industry lines. The largest
Gennan labor union is the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), which is an
umbrella organization that includes 17 industry unions. Roughly 80 percent of all
unionized workers are members of the DGB. Employers either bargain with the
DGB member unions individually, or are members of a nationwide employer
association that bargains on their behalf. The employer associations are also
organized along industry lines. Although wage contracts are ultimately negotiated
at the Land, or plant level, the national unions publicize their wage demands, which
then become a standard for othernegotiations. The public sector and metal workers'
unions are widely considered important pattern-setters.
A significant feature ofthe WestGennan system is that it is possible for collective
bargaining agreements to become "generally binding" for all employees and
enterprises in an industry, regardless of whether they belong to the labor union or
- . ... . , .. _.. ".' .',
employer association. Eitherparty to a collective bargaining agreement may petition
the labor minister in the liinder to extend the contract to nonunion enterprises if
more than half of employees in the relevant industry are employed by firms that
were a party to the negotiated contract. Although only about one-third of German
workers are union members, collective bargaining may affect as many as 90% of
German workers because of contract extensions and spill-overs. Burda and Sachs
(1988) note that the process of contract extension ~compresses regional wage
differences.
Because a great many nonunion employees are covered by collective bargaining
agreements, and because there is a good deal ofspill-overevento nonunion workers
who are not covered by legal contracts, the union-nonunion distinction is not
particularly relevant in West Gennany. As a consequence, researchers have found
only a t~~ial wage differential between union and nonunion members in West
'Germany~(see'Schmidt, 1991). Due to the large role played by unions, one would
1) Our description ofcollective bargaining in West Germany draws heavily from Schmidt (1991)
and Burda and Sachs (1988).
2expect more wage compression and emphasis on seniority in West Germany than in
a country with plant-level bargaining and weak unions, such as the U.S".·,
East Germany (GDR)
There was a great deal of centralization in the labor and product markets in East
Germany2). All firms were owned by the state, and an elaborate plan directed the
allocation of inputs, the distribution of outputs, wage levels, and prices. Only six
broad compensation groups existed for production workers. Wage levels for these
groups, however, varied by industry. But even within the wage groups there was
extensive variation. Stephan and Wiedemann (1990) document that this variation
was quite large and cannot be explained by the official wage norms, so that to some
extent individual enterprises were able to deviate from the planned targets. Much
of the "unplanned" variation comes from bonuses, which accounted for 6% of
.compensation, on average, in East Germany. Enterprises had more discretion over
bonuses than over the base wage. East German workers were free to work for
whichever firm they chose, but rationed housing may have frequently limited
mobility.
'East German plants were typically much larger than West German plants.
Vortmann (1985) contends that East Gerrilan enterprises used their discretionary
power to attract the workers they needed. Ifan industry was at a disadvantage due
to the wage targets specified in the government plan, firms could often circumvent
the plan. Thus, the East German wage structure should exhibit some features that
are common in western economies. Nevertheless, the Communist system operated
like a large internal labor market, with rules and party membership playing an
important role in the allocation ofjobs and wages
3
).
2) See Siebert and Schmieding (1991) for a discussion of the GDR economy, and of the
restructuring effort under way.
3) This analogy has also been made by Vecemik (1991) in reference to Czechoslovakia.
3A.The Educational Systems in Germany
Unlike the U.S., the Gennan educational systems are characterized by a multitude
of different kinds of schools, many of them offering alternative routes toa similar
degree. Despite their common history, the education systems in East ~d West
Gennany have diverged significantly, making direct comparisons difficult. This
section gives a basic description of the educational systems in the two Gennanies.
For more complete descriptions of the educational systems see Waterkamp (1987)
on East Gennany and Fiihr (1989) on West Gennany.
West Germany
Figure 1 contains a tree-diagram outlining the education systems in East and West
Gennany. Primary school in West Gennany starts at the age of six and comprises
the first four grades. After grade four, the secondary school system branches into
three.alternative routes. The J.llost basic branch (Haupt~chule)lastsup to grade 9. (or
10 "in some states) and combines general education with certain preparatory courses
for more technical or clerical vocations. It is supposed to lead to a subsequent
apprenticeship orvocational training. The middle branch (Realschule) has a different
vocational focus than the Hauptschule, and offers a larger choice between liberal
arts classes and courses with a more practical oqentation. This branch ends after
grade 10 aI!d may lead to an apprenticeship, further education in vocational schools,
or a switch into Gymnasium, which is the third branch of the secondary school
system.
The Gymnasium is the most intellectually oriented track, and is designed to
provide a thorough education in the liberal arts that prepares students for further
academic training. Gymnasium ends after grade 13 with a general exam (Abitur)
which serves as a prerequisite for access to the university system. .The last two years
.' 9fGymnasium are roughly comparable to the first years ofcollege in the U.S. Since
the 1970s some states have introducedintegrated secondary schools (Gesamtschulen)
combining all the three branches and leading to the various secondary school
degrees.
University training in West Gennany is completely focused on the area of
specialization and ends in a Diploma. The average time to completion was 6.9 years
4in 1987 (Scheuer, 1990) and has increased even more since. Inaddition to academic
universities there is another kind of post-secondary institution known as
Fachhochschulen. These institutions offer a more practically oriented training
usually in engineering or business disciplines; they are roughly comparable to
professional colleges in the U.S. Furthermore, the courses of study are generally
shorter than on universities (average length 4.4 years in 1987). Fachhochschulen can
be entered after the 12th grade in Gymnasium.or after completion of a
Fachoberschule. The latter comprises grades 11 and 12 and can be entered with a
Realschule degree or equivalent. It combines practical job oriented training in
workshops with more general education.
Vocational training in West Germany consists usually of an apprenticeship in a
business firm combined with part time schooling at a state run Berufsschule.
Apprenticeships can last for two or three years during which apprentices earn a basic
allowance from their employer. Berufsschule provides theoretical foundations for
the profession in which an apprentice has trained as well as liberal arts education.
A completed apprenticeship is prerequisite to many skilled jobs in industry,
administration, and the service sector. Two to three years after completion trained
workers can enroll in two year Fachschule which enables them to become master
craftsmen in their field.
r
East Germany
Due to a series of reforms the educational system in East Germany is simpler.
The main building block is the integrated Polytechnische Oberschule (POS), which
is compulsory for everyone up to grade 10. Its quality and scope are generally
regarded as comparable to the West German Realschule. Further secondary training
is provided in the Erweiterten Oberstufe (EOS) for two more grades leading to the
East German Abitur. Access to the EOS is conditional on grades and political
factors. In addition, diversity in student representation based on social structure is
a consideration in admission to the EOS.
Unlike in West Germany, admission to a university is conditional on an additional
entry exam. Admitted are EOS graduates, graduates of Fachschulen (see below),
young workers who completed a three-year apprenticeship with Abitur and graduates
ofthe preparatory "Worker and Peasant Faculties" (see Glaessner, 1985 for details).
These indirect routes to university serve the purpose ofcreating a student body that
reflects the social structure of the population and are quantitatively much more
5important than in the west. Since the seventies three quarters ofthe students seeking
admission to a university have had some work experience orcompleted their military
training. This has led to the gradual introduction of a one year practical training
reqp.irement for EOS graduates without professional training starting in 1976,
basically lengthening their education by a year (Panorama DDR, 1983).
Admissions to the various fields are regulated _by state plan reflecting the
prospective needs of a profession. This planning was apparently not always fully
effective: many university graduates were overqualified for theirjobs in the seventies
which led to a reduction in the number of admissions (Scheuer, 1990). This trend
was reversed somewhat in the eighties. Most university programs in East Germany
are designed to be completed"in four years, a one year extension is only granted in
exceptional cases. Only about three quarters ofuniversity courses are devoted to the
majorfield ofstudy, the rest is taken up by courses in Marxism-Leninism, languages,
and sports.
Fachschulen in East Germany are post-secondary institutions comparable to the
West German Facbhochschulen. They mainly trained engineers and technical
experts, and since the 1970s they trained nurses. Fachschulen have three-year
programs. They admit graduates ofthe EOS as well as young men and women with
a compJeted practical training.
Like in the West, vocational training consists of a dual education combining an
apprenticeship with vocational school (Berufsschule). These schools are usually part
ofthe enterprise offering the apprenticeship. Most apprenticeship programs last two
years.
n. Data Sets
The East German micro data used in this study come from the Survey"on Income
of Blue and White Collar Households in the GDR (Einkommensstichprobe in
Arbeiter- und Angestelltenhaushalten). This is a cross-sectional survey that was
conducted every two orthree years by the Statistical Office ofthe GDR. The·survey
was intended to contribute "reliable information on the level and change of the
incomes ofblue and white collar households and about other aspects ofthe standard
of living" in East Germany (Statistisches Amt, 1990). Aggregate results from the
survey are published in the Statistical Abstract of theGDR and in other official
6publications. We were able to obtain an ffiM standard label tape containing the
-"surVey conducted inSeptember 1988 from the former StatisticalOffice,·ofthe GDR.
The survey was conducted in the year before the collapse of the GDR, and it is the
last such survey taken before German unification. The survey contains data on
79,000 individuals in 28,000 households, or roughly 0.5% ofthe total population of
the GDR. Krause and Schwarze (1990) provide an extensive description ofthe data
set.
The survey contains detailed questions on various categories of income of
individuals and households. In addition, the survey provides basic demographic and
. labor force information on each household member. Finally, a set of questions is
asked about the households" ownership of cars and household appliances, such as
televisions and dishwashers. A household is defined as an economic unit sharing
income, and would include a household member who contributes to th,e household
income but lives separately.
The sampling design ofthe survey is sufficiently different from typical household
surveys conducted in western countries to warrant some elaboration. The basic
sampling unit is not the residence ofthe household, it is the employer. Firms were
selected by the central Statistical Office to participate in the sample to achieve a
"representative distribution across regions and industries. Within a selected firm a
-random sample ofemployees was drawn from payroll records. The household ofthe
selected employee became a target household for the' sample. -The target respondent
was contacted early in September 1988. At that time, the respondent received a
record sheet similar to the questionnaire to prepare for the interview. The interviews
took place at the end ofSeptember, and the respondent provided the information on
all the members of the household (i.e., proxy responses). Earnings for the
l)
respondent, however, were supplied by the payroll office of the finn. The
interviewer was supposed to have verified the firm-reported income amounts with
~e respondent and to supplement the payroll data if necessaryo. Note that the
individual that was interviewed may be someone other than the household head.
The firms selectedfor the sample comprise all state-ownedenterprises,state-owned
farms, and certain cooperatives in the trade sector. Excluded are other cooperatives,
private enterprises, and joint ventures. Individuals working in such firms can still
be part of the sample if they are members of the household of a target individual.
4) The variance ofearnings does not differ between self-respondents and proxy-respondents in the
survey. Returns to education are slightly lower for proxy-respondents, however. Vortrnann (1985)
claims that the income levels for proxy-respondents are under reported.
7" A target household drawn within a sample finn was excluded from the sample ifany
one ofthe household members was currently a member ofthe armed forces or state
security, or was a full-time employee of the party organization or other mass
organizations like unions. A household was also excluded if the target respondent
owas an apprentice or working at her own home.
The sampling design-leads 'to anumber of problems. First, a- household is more
likely to be drawn for the sample if it has more earners. Thus, the sample is not
representative of the households in the GDR and cannot be used for analyses of
household characteristics. Secondly, the exclusion of certain sectors distorts the
distribution of workers across industries. Despite these problems, we show below
that the sample is reasonably representative of the employed population in East
Germany5}.
To the extent possible, the income variables in the sample refer to monthly income
during August 1988. Vortmann (1985) claims that this leads to some distortions in
the income measure because August is unrepresentative with respect to sick time.
Some sources of income, like employment bonuses and interest, accrue only on an
annual basis. Respondents were asked to report annual income for 1987 for such
categories, which we converted to monthly amounts by dividing by 12.
v
West Germany
For West Germany, we use the 1988 wave ofthe Socio Economic Panel (SOEP).
The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of about 6,000 households that has been
conducted annually since 1984. All household members 16 years old or older are
.' interviewed directly; the survey follows sample members ifthey leave their original
household. Proxy interviews are only utilized in rare cases. The panel deliberately . .
over-sampled about 1,600households with foreign-born individuals. We exclude this
subsample from our analysis. Due to attrition, there were about 3,700 households
left in 1988, with 7,600 interviewed individuals. The interviews for the panel are
mainly conducted in March and April ofeach year. Most interviews were conducted
5) It is interesting to note that there are no missing values in the data set because individuals
refused to respond to certain questions. However, the Statistisches Amt (1990) points out that the
survey was voluntary. While the guidelines for the selection of respondents make provisions for
the fact that complete refusals will occur, the Statistical Office does not provide statistics on the
response rates.
8by direct interviewer contact (about 60%); the remainder were conducted by mail
and to a lesser extent by telephone.
The survey consists of a household questionnaire and separate questionnaires for
each individual in the household. The questionnaires include a constant set ofitems
asked in each wave. For the household these are questions concerning living
quarters, household income and assets, and noninterviewed children. For the
individuals information is collected on basic demographics, education, labor market
participation, unemployment, earnings, taxes and social security contributions, time
use, satisfaction with various aspects of life, health, and political preferences. In
addition, there are topical modules on each wave.
Eastern Germany in Transition
In 1990 the SOEP initiated a special survey of the former East Germany, the so
called SOEP-East. The first wave ofthe SOEP-East was conducted (m9stly) in June
1990, just before the monetary union, and a follow-up survey was conducted
(mostly) between March and May 1991. The first wave also included retrospective
information on earnings in 1989. The sample consists of households drawn at
Lrandom from municipalities in East Germany based on the Central Register of
Population. A total of 2,179 households with 4,453 people over'age 16 participated
in the survey. Importantly, individuals were included in the follow-up survey even
ifthey had moved to the western section ofGermany. Although the SOEP-East was
recently made available, the SOEP-West is not yet available for 1990 and 1991. We
use the SOEP-East to examine the preliminary effects ofthe transition ofthe eastern
German labor market.
United States
We use the March 1989 Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate basic wage
regressions and to describe the income distribution in the U.S. The CPS conta~s
inform,ation on individuals.in a sample of 56,500 households, one-quarter of which
are asked questions on weekly earnings and union status. Weekly wages are
examined for the U.S. and monthly wages for the Germanies. We suspect that wage
dispersion in the U.S. would be even greater if monthly earnings were used instead
9of weekly earnings because ofvariation in weeks worked. In some ofour analysis,
we also analyze the Outgoing Rotation Group Files for various years.
III. Distribution of Earnings and Returns to Education
We created samples of 18 to 65 year-old full-time, nonagricultural workers in East
and West Gennany and the U.S.
6
l. For West Gennany and the U.S. we also
excluded self-employed workers. There are no self-employed workers in the East
Gennan data set. To the extent possible we have defined the variables to be
comparable.
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of the variables for each country.
Mean earnings in East Gennany were about 1200 Marks. The spread ofthe earnings
distributions can be compared by looking at the standard deviations of log earnings
and the interquartile ranges. Unsurprisingly, East Gennany has the tightest
distribution ofearnings7). However, there is a significant spread in the distribution.
The interquartile range of log earnings is 40% in East Gennany, 50% in West
Gennany, and 75% in the U.S. The standard deviation of log earnings just for
unionized workers in the U.S. is about the same as for all of'Yest Gennany (.41 vs.
.44). Relatively tight earnings distributions are a feature ofboth parts of Gennany.
Figure 2 presents a graph of Kernel density estimates of the earnings distributions
of male household heads. To make units comparable, all distributions have been
shifted SQ that the median worker earns
the same amount in East Gennan Marks in all countries. The West Gennan and
U.S. distributions exhibit greater positive skewness than the East Gennan one.
6) We focus on full-time workers because our earnings data for the Germanies pertain to the
monthly wage, and hours worked will greatly affect the amount of monthly income for part-time
workers.
7) Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Vecemik (1991) find that the wage distributions were
more compressed in the socialist economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, USSR, and
Yugoslavia than in the U.K. and Austria in the late 1980s. They also find significant differences
in the wage structures among eastern block countries, and different trends over time. The East
German wage structure is compressed even by east block standards. See Bergson (1984) and
Brown (1977) for earlier analyses of wage structures in Soviet-style economies.
10Some caution should be exercised in comparing income distributions between the
three economies
8>. First, the income measures are gross of taxes. The income tax
system in East Germany was only moderately progressive with a maximum average
tax rate of20 percent for incomes above 15,120 Marks. West Germany, on the other
hand, has a highly nonlinear tax schedule with an increasing marginal tax rate up to
a maximum income of 130,032 DM in 1988. Thus, the tax system is rather
progressive, and the net income distribution would be quite a bit tighter. We do not
attempt to calculate net incomes since the tax system makes it hard to attribute taxes
to husbands and wives in multiple-earner families.
A second difficulty is due to nonpecuniary benefits ofemployment. According to
anecdotal evidence, one means of transferring additional resources to individuals
favored by the East German regime was through greater access to goods. For
example, a physician who was regarded as important would be given a house far
below the normal cost. Valuing such transfers is oifficult because often there was
no market for comparable goods. Transfers in kind are not captured by ourdata, and
their inclusion probably would increase the right-tail of the income distribution
9>.
Nonpecuniary benefits are also omitted in our analysis of the West.
The third difficulty involves relative prices. Necessities were substantially
subsidized in East Germany. For example, rent for a one bedroom apartment was
some"75 M~rks a month (6% of the average salary), a local bus ticket 20 Pfennigs,
etc. On the other hand, luxuries were comparatively expensive, e.g., 'a Czech Skoda
car cost 25,000 Marks. Therefore, in terms ofreal consumption possibilities, earners
-, at the lower end of the distribution spent relatively much of their budget on
necessities and were comparatively better off in East Germany than in the western
economies. The opposite is true for the rich. Hence, the "real" income distribution
inc East Germany was much tighter than suggested by our measures of nominal
income.
This last difference between the Germanies, which should be the most important
concern, has evaporated with the monetary union beginning July 1990. Since wage
contracts were converted to West German marks at a rate of one to "one, the 1988
income distribution would have approximately characterized the situation at the
beginning of the transition process. With the major exceptions of rents, the prices
8) Hauser (1991) presents a careful discussion of problems in making distributional comparisons
between East and West Germany.
9) We have estimated Engle curves for cars and other consumer durables in EastGermany. These
results indicate that, despite rationing, income was an important determinant of consumption.
11, and availability ofgoods changed quickly after monetary union. Hence, thinking of
the distributions as characterizing the situation in the Gennanies on the eve of
political union in October 1990 is a plausible exercise. (The average exchange rate
in 1991 was 1.66 D-Marks per U.S. dollar.)
Return to Table 1. The similarities between the Germanies are even more striking
when comparing the family income distributions. The table reports log standard
deviations for total family income. They are computed for the families in the sample
with at least one full-time worker. This is the only group for which the East German
data are roughly representative. The estimates indicate that family incomes in the
two Germanies have a very similar level of dispersion. West Germany stands out
as the only country where family income is less variable than individual earnings.
Apparently, incomes between spouses there are strongly negatively correlated.
Importantly, female labor force participation in West Gennany is quite low (49.6%
fu 1988) compared to the U.S. (65%) and especially East Germany (81 %).
Rate ofReturn to Schooling
Table 1 reports the distribution among five education categories. The results for
East Germany correspond closely to the counts from the Labor Markets Monitor, the
first labor market survey conducted in the new states after unification (see Bielinski
and von Rosenblatt, 1991). As described in the Appendix, we constructed a
continuous years of schooling variable using infonnation on individuals' highest
1
degree and post-secondary training. We present evidence below that our
linearIzation works well in practice.
Ac~ording to our continuous education measure, on average, workers in East
Germany spend slightly more years in school than their counterparts in West
Gennany. This is primarily due to the importance of Fachschulen which were
attended by 19 percent of East Gennan workers, whereas only 6 percent of West
Gennans attended Fachhochschulen. The somewhat surprising finding that a larger
fraction of the East Gennan population has technical or academic training has also
been observed by others. Scheuer (1990) attributes this to the fact that occupations
like nurses are·trained at the East Gennan Fachschulen. Since we included them in
the West German count for the "technical school" category we can discard this
explanation. Enrollment in higher education grew rapidly in East Gennan after
World War IT, but levelled off in the 1970s and 1980s; enrollment in higher
12education in West Germany grew considerably in the 1970s and 1980s, surpassing
the East German level.
We estimated standard ordinary least squares log-earnings regressions using either
the unrestricted education dummies or the linear years of schooling variable. The
results are shown in Table 2a. Surprisingly, the estimated rate of return to a year
of schooling is tl!e same in both parts of Germany: 7.7 percent higher earnings per
year of schooling. This is in ,contrast to Schwarze (1991a, b), who reports a much
lower return to education for men inEast Germany (about 5.6 percent using this data
set). Lower returns to higher education in East Germany than West Germany are
also reported by Stephan and Wiedemann (1990) in a study ofpayroll data for 1988.
Notice that our unrestricted dummy variable specifications (columns 2 and 4) also
find a lower return to post-secondary education in East Germany.
How can these seemingly conflicting results be reconciled? Most importantly,
higher,education in West Germany takes longer than in the east. In 1987, the
average university graduate took 6.9 years to complete his or her degree in the west
while most graduates in the east finished in four years. But the higher education
groups -- tec~ical school and university -- are the groups that have the most
pronounced differences in relative earnings between the east and the west. However,
our conclusion is that the higher returns to these degrees in the west are just due to
longer sc~ooling, not to higher returns per year ofschooling. Schwarze (l991a), on
the other hand, mechanically assigns the same number of years of schooling to
similar groups for both the east and the west. His results therefore have to reflect
jour dummy variable results.
We consider the continuous schooling measure more informative. For East and
West germans, a year of schooling means a year of foregone earnings, so in this
respect, the schooling coefficient is a measure of the return on a comparable
investl1lentlO). There were no fees for higher education in either country. From this
perspective, young Germans faced similar budget constraints in both parts of the
country. The structure of the East German labor market apparently did not provide
major disincentives for higher education, which is also borne out by the finding of
similar mean years of education.
Furthermore, we provide some evidence in Figure 3 that the earnings-schooling
relationship is indeed approximately log-linear in both parts ofGermany. The figure
displays the coefficients on dummy variables for each possible value the schooling
10) This is one of Mincer's (1974) essential insights.
13variable can take
l
!). The graph also shows the lines corresponding to the OLS
regression estimates for the continuous schooling measure. The linear specification
reflects the unrestricted earnings-education relationship rather well.
Finally, the continuous schooling measure allows a comparison with the U.S.;
which is shown in column (5) of the table. The rate of return to schooling in the
\ U.S. was greater than 9 percent in 1989, almost 2 percentage points above the
Germanies. The payoff to a year ofeducation was unusually high in the U.S. in the
late 1980s, but even in more typical years the payoff to education was probably
higher in the U.S. than in the Germanies. Given the high cost of college tuition in
the U.S., it is not surprising that the payoff to a year of education is greater in the
U.S. than in the Germanies.
That we observe more schooling on average for the East German sample than for
West German sample, of course, does not mean that the East Germans are
necessarily better educated. The numbers may, for-example, reflect that formal
education has been more important in the east while there is more upgrading ofskills
on the job in the west. This is consistent with the much higher return to experience
iri West Germany (4 percent in the first year compared to 2 percent in the east).
Notice, however, that the experience profiles in West Germany are also steeper than
in the U.S.
Figure 4 presents a plot of age-earnings profiles estimated with dummy variables
for three-year age groups in the two Germanies. Profiles for unskilled workers and
university graduates are shown separately. Especially for unskilled workers, the East
German profile is essentially flat. Figure 5 presents age-earnings profiles for men
j
in the Germanies and the U.S. Again the much lower returns to work experience in
East Germany. are apparent.
The R
2 of the regressions in Table 2a are higher for West Germany than for the
U.S. ,This is not surprising since there seems to be more emphasis on formal
educational attainment and seniority compared to individual performance in German
compensation systems. But the R
2 is highest for West Germany, around 45 percent,
compared to 41 percent for the east. Thus, even in East Germany there is a good
deal of earnings variation left over after accounting for the standard human capital
factors. The system apparently left enough room for industry, firm, or individual
specific factors to influence compensation significantly.
11) There are nine points shown for East Gennany despite the fact that education is only coded
in six separate levels. Recall that additional values were created for university graduates under 30.
We also separate out physicians since medical school requires an additional year of study.
14It is useful to summarize this information with the following ANDVA table for the
models in columns 1,3 and 5 ofTable 2a:
ANDVA for Simple Earnings Regressions
Men and Women
East Germany West Germany U.S.
Total variance 0.099 0.192 0.278
Explained variance 0.041 0.088 0.091
Residual variance 0.058 0.105 0.187
-
Although the total log-earnings variance in West Germany is twice that ofthe east,
the s~e pattern emerges. Slightly less than half the variance is explained by
standard human capital factors. This contrasts with the U.S. where the human capital
variables explain about the same amount of earnings variance as in West Germany.
The larger total variance in the U.S. is entirely due to the higher residual variat.ion.
Table 2a also includes a dummy indicating gender; women receive 25 to 30
percent lower earnings than men in all three countries, other things held constant.
J Tables 2b. and 2c report separate wage regressions for men and women. The
estimated return to education is greater for women than men in all three countries.
~xperience profiles differ little for men and women who work full-time in East
Germany: they are flat in both cases. This contrasts sharply with the western
countries where women's profiles are flatter than men's. One may suspect that this
is related to the fact that labor force attachment of women is much greater in East
Germany than West Germany. On the other hand, the U.S. has a female labor force
participation rate that is much higher than West Germany's, but even greater
expansion in the male-female wage gap with experience.
Thus, although the average male-female wage gap is about the same in both parts
of Germany (25 percent), the gap varies substantially depending on education and
experience. The following table summarizes these results.
15Earnings Differential Between Men and Women
Years of Years of pot. East West U.S.
Schooling experience Germany Germany
10 10 0.286 0.236 0.282
10 30 0.282 0.312 0.470
16 10 0.202 0.194 0.174
16 30 0.198 0.270 0.362
-
Table 3 reports some further regression estimates adding additional regressors.
·Columns (1) and (3) add dummy variables for marital status and marital status
interact~d with gender. There is little effect of marital status on the earnings of
either men or women in East Germany while both West Germany and the U.S. have
a large earnings differential between married men and women.
In column (2) we add a number of additional variables available on the East
German data set. White collar employees earn about 4 percent more than blue collar
workers. This contrasts with the large effects for the western countries (on the order
of 20 percent), and is probably a reflection of communist ideology against white
collar labor. Additionally, we find a 15 percent premium for workers who work on
late~hifts·in East Germany. Such a positive premium has proved difficult to find
with cross-sectional micro data for western countries, and may reflect the emphasis
on rules in the socialist system.
In summary, these regressions document several differences between the East
German, West German, and U.S. wage structures. Nevertheless, the "results are
supportive of Brown's (1977, p. 43) conclusion based on casual evidence: "The
white-collared apart, the most remarkable feature ofthe comparison between Soviet-
-type and Western pay structures is their extent of similarity."
16'IV. The Eastern German Labor Market in Transition. -'-
The wage-setting institutions in eastern Gennany have undergone a rapid and
dramatic transfonnation. On midnight ofJune 30, 1990, fonn~l monetary union took
place. At this time East Gennan wage contracts were converted to West Gennan
marks at a rate ofone for one, and the legal, tax, and social insurance systems in the
two Germanies were hannonized. In the month following monetary union, the East
German economy sunk into a deep depression, with industrial output quickly falling
to roughly half its 1989 level (see Akerlof, et aI., 1991). Since the collapse ofEast
Germany in late 1989, employment fell from 9.2 million in 1989 to 7.1 million in
July 199Jl
2
). Unemployment increased from around 1% of the labor force to over
10% of the labor force. And even these numbers understate the extent of
employment adjustment because a substantial number of employed workers who
were put on short-time hours (Kurzarbeit), early retirement, and public works jobs
(see Bellman, et aI., 1992).
Even before the monetary union, West Gennanunions aggressively organized East
German workers. In early 1990 the West German unions achieved remarkable
success in organizing East Gennan workers, in part because the old East Gennan
Communist unions were completely discredited. The'structure ofunions'in eastern
Germany is now similar to that in the west: unions organize and bargain along
Land/industry lines, although some contracts are being negotiated for all new Lander
}
simultaneously. The first round ofbargaining in the summer of 1990 yielded mostly
lump-sum wage increases. However, in some industries (e.g. chemical) large
percentage base wage increases were negotiated. The construction industry
mediately tied wages in the east to about 60% ofthe western level. Contracts were
generally written for short time periods. Like in the west, the eastern unions have
sought to prevent contract wages from varying with the perfonnance of individual
finns.
The second round ofnegotiations was held in the winter of 1990-91. Inthis round
many sectors agreed to tie wages to a specified proportion ofthe western level, and
schedules were set to gradually achieve parity with the west in 1994 or 1995. There
is tremendous variance in the east-~est wage ratio across industries. For example,
12) An estimated 400,000 workers migrated to the west or commute to work in the west They
are not included in these figures.
17cleaning services in East Berlin pay 100% ofthe West Berlin level, while the eastern
textile industry pays 43% of the western level. Most contracts set base wages at
50% to 60% of the western level. This exaggerates take home pay in the east,
however, because bonuses and fringe benefits are much lower or nonexistent in the
east. Furthennore, work hours are longer in the east and vacation time is shorter.
Bispinck,et al.-(l99l) calculate that metal workers in Saxony-earn 44.8% of the
hourly wage of Bavarian metal workers, although the base wage is formally set at
a 58.6% level. Many general contracts (Manteltrarifvertrage) were also written in
1991. These contracts set general wage structures for a handful of skill levels.
Workers were thereby classified into skill groups, causing some friction. Notably,
in the public sector unions initially negotiated a contract that completely eliminated
seniority pay. Workers went on strike against this contract, and it was subsequently
modified. We also note that several firms are believed to not pay negotiated contract
rates.
Another critical development in the east is the process ofprivatization, carried out
by the Treuhand. As of November 1991, the Treuhand sold about 25% of East
German companies to private concerns, and was subsidizing a sizable proportion of
the remainder (see The Economist, March 21, 1992, p. 71). The Treuhand closed
down only about 6% of east German companies. Akerlof, et al. contend that
managers of Treuhand-operated finns have had little incentive or ability to resist
union wage demands, which is partly responsible for the fast growth of eastern
wages.
A. Results
One question that immediately arises in studying the economic transformation of
the East Gennan labor market is, how should the East German labor market be
defmed after unification? We choose to define the labormarket based on geographic
location. Thus, fonner East Germans who migrated west or commute to work in the
west are not included in our sample ofeastern Germany. As a practical matter, this
is of little significance because migrants and commuters make up only about 0.5%
of our samplel3). On the other hand, it is instructive to study former East Germans
13) Ifwe include the commuters and migrants in a wage regression using 1990 data, when they
were observed in eastern Germany, their average residual is 0.12. Given the small number of
commuters and migrants, this finding suggests that they would not have had a large influence on
the estimated regression, had they remained in eastern Germany.
18who we observe working in the western part ofGennany separately. These workers
provide a rough indication of how fonner East Gennans would fare in the West-
Gennan labor market, although one must be concerned about selective migration and
commuting.
Since so many east Gennan workers were placed on short-time hours (18% ofour
sample in 1991), we include short-time workers in our analysis. The Gennan
govemment subsidized short:-time workers so they earned 63% to 68% of their
previous pay. Finns were supposed to add another 22% to their-pay, bringing short-
time workers' pay up to 85%-90% of their previous level. In our sample, workers
on short-time worked 32.8 hours per week, on average, compared to 43.1 hours for
workers on regular-time hours.
B. Wage Growth and Dispersion
- We first tum to the growth of wages, which Akerlof, et al. (1991) and others
identify as the main source of the eastern Gennan depression. Table 4 summarizes
the rise in earnings in East Gennany since 1988. The table is based on the Survey
of Blue and White Collar households for 1988, retrospective earnings data from the
, SOEP-East for 1989, and current wage reports from the SOEP-East for 1990 and
-- 1991. In spite of splicing together different wage series, the-1988 and 1989·data
(both years before unification) are remarkably similar, suggesting that the data are
comparable. East Gennan wages grew rapidly between 1989 and 1991. (The CPI
increased by about 6% between 1988 and March 1991, so these wage changes can
be thought of as mostly real changes)14l. Between 1989 and 1990 the average wage
increased by 12.5%, and between 1990 and 1991 it increased by another 22.8%.
Over the period 1989-1991 wages grew by 38.3%. This growth is even more
impressive in view ofthe fact that nearly one-fifth ofworkers were placed on short-
time hours.
In spite ofdramatic growth, wages in the east are still only about 40% ofthe west
Gennan level. Nevertheless, the eastGennan real wage growth is a marked contrast
14) One cautionary note is that, although the average CPI was relatively stable between 1988 and
1991, there were wide differences in the rate of inflation for many goods. For example, rental
costs jumped 58% in January 1991, while food prices increased 15%, clothing and shoe prices
decreased 30%, and furniture prices decreased 20% between 1989 and January 199I. The rapidly
changing prices of consumer goods are likely to have distributional consequences that go beyond
changes in the wage structure.
19to that ofother fonner East-block countries. Forexample, in the last quarter of 1991
real wages were lower by 43% in Bulgaria, 26% in Czechoslovakia, 8% in Hungary,
0.2% in Poland, and 20% in Romania relative to their 1990 level (see Boeri and
Keese, 1992). The unique relationship between eastern and western Gennany has
clearly cushioned the transition to amarket based economy for East Gennany.
For the subsample of individuals who were working in both-1990 and 1991,
earnings grew by 24 percent. Using longitudinal data from the SOEP-East, we can
decompose the variability in individuals' log wage growth between 1990 and 1991
according to the type ofjob change using the fonnula:
0"2 = :r. [ PjO": + Pj(llj-ll? ]
where ~ is the total variance of the change in log wage, 0"/ is the variance of the
change in log wage for group i, Pi is the fraction of ~e sample belonging to group
i, Jli is the mean wage change for group i, and II is the change in the grand mean.
Table 5 contains the results of this decomposition. The overall variance in log
earnings growth for individuals in East Gennany (.056) during this period of
dramatic transfonnation is lower than the level Abowd and Card (1989) report for
the U.S. (over 0.12), but higher than the typical level that we find for West Gennany
using the SOEP for 1984-89-(0.036)15). (In tenns of standard deviations, the figures
are: 0.24 for eastern Gennany, 0.35 for the U.S., and 0.19 for West Gennany.)
Nearly 85% ofemployed East Gennans in 1990 and 1991 remained employed by
the same finn, and 77% remained on the same job. Ten percent of east German
workers reported changing jobs without any intervening unemployment. Over two-
thirds ofthe total variance in log earnings growth is due to individuals who remained
on the same job. Job-changers who did not suffer intervening unemployment
c~ntributed 20 percent of the total variance.
Looking cross-sectionally, it is clear from Table 4 that earnings variability
increased in eastern Gennany following unification. The variance of the level of
monthly earnings (in DM) increased each year since 1988, and was 150% greater in
1991 than in 1988. Notice also that the coefficient ofvariation ofearnings increased
from 0.30 to 0.35, in spite of the large increase in mean earnings. However, the
standard deviation-of log monthly earnings shows no clear trend. The level ofwage
dispersion in eastern Gennany still has a long way to go before it reaches the West
15) The U.S. figure is based on log ~ua1 earnings.
20Gennan level, however. In West Gennany, the coefficient ofvariation of monthly
earnings was consistently around 0.44 between 1984 and 1989.
Table 6 gives the ratio ofvarious percentiles of the earnings distribution relative
to the median for eastern Gennany, West Gennany, and the U.S. in selected years.
The wage distribution in eastern Gennany was notably stable between 1988 and
1990, but the top 20 percent of wage earners gained significantly on the median
earner in 1991. -The increase in earnings dispersion in east Gennany occurred
mainly at the upper-tail of the wage distribution. On the other hand, the wage
structure in West Gennany was conspicuously stable in the 1980s, especially
compared to the U.S.
To explore changes in the east Gennany wage structure further, Figure 6 presents
a graph of earnings growth between 1988 and 1991 for each percentile of the
earnings distribution. That is, the figure gives the percentage wage increase for a
worker occupying each percentile of the wage distribution in 1991 relative to a
worker occupying the same percentile ofthe distribution in 1988. Itis quit clearthat
the increase in earnings variability occurred primarily because ofan expansionofthe
right-hand tail of the distribution: the top 10% of the wage distribution had
extraordinary income growth. Recall that Figure 2 showed that the right-hand tail
ofthe East Gennan wage distribution in 1988 was unusually short compared to West
Gennany and the U.S.
'. The left-hand tail of the eastern Gennan wage distribution experienced about
average wage growth after unification. This fmding is significant because one may
suspect that the Communist government in East Gennany artificially raised the
earnings oflow-income workers, and that the move to a market economy wouldhave
had a greater effect on the low-wage earners. There are two explanations for why
the low-wage earners were not especially hurt by unification. First, Figure 2
;indicates that there was not a great disparity in the left-hand tails of the, wage
distribution between East and West Gennany just before unification. Second, after
unification union contracts and government policies may be maintaining low-skill
workers' wages above their equilibrium level in eastern Gennany. As shown below,
the fact that the unemployment rate is now much higher for less-educated workers
in eastern Gennany suggests that there may be some merit to this view. Table
7 investigates the extent ofyear-to-year mobility in workers' earnings in eastern and
21western Gennany16l. Workers are cross-classified by quintile of the earnings
distribution each year. There is greater earnings mobility in eastern Gennany than
western Gennany, especially for workers in_~e middle of the earnings distribution.
In 1991, nearly 40% of the top fifth of wage earners in eastern Gennany were not
in this income class in the preceding year, whereas in West Gennany only about
13% of workers joined the top 20% in a typical year.
In Table 8 we summarize the characteristics of the top 10% of wage-earners in
eastern Gennany in 1991, the group that has undergone the most significant change
in relative earnings since unificationl7). Compared to the rest of wage-earners, the
top 10% is much more likely to hold professional or executive positions, to have
higher education, to work in private finns, to live in a large city (e.g., Berlin,
Leipzig, Dresden), to be self-employed, and work in a newly founded finn. These
are characteristics that are associated with top wage-earners in the West. About half
of workers in the top 10%·ofthe wage distribution in 1991 were in the top 10% of
the wage distribution in 1990. Earnings grew by over 50% between 1990 and 1991
for the top 10% of earners, compared to 25% for all others. Since the top 10% of
wage earners still have some distance to go until they are as relatively successful in
the east as in the west, the evolution of this group would be especially interesting
to track in the future.
C. Wage Regressions For Eastern Germany
Table 9 presents simple wage regressions using each cross-section of the SOEP-
East s~lVey. For comparison, the first column reports estimates for East Gennany
in 1988, and the second column reports estimates for West Gennany in 1988. The
1988 ~ast Gennan sUlVey yields coefficient estimates and an R-square that are very
close to the SOEP-East for 1989, again suggesting that the 1988 East Gennan sUlVey
is reasonably representative of the work force
18l
•
16) Because more recent data are not available, we use data for 1988 and 1989 for West
Germany. Mobility was only slightly higher between 1984 and 1985, which was a recessionary
period in West Germany.
17). We included self-employed workers in Table 8 because ofinterest in entrepreneurship. SeIf-
employed workers are excluded from all other results.
18) Oddly, the experience profile is steeper in 1989 than 1988. Upon further investigation, we
found that this result is due to a few outliers with low experience. The other coefficients are not
22There are a number ofinteresting changes in the wage structure in East Germany
between 1988 and 1991. First, the rate ofreturn to education fell from .077 to .062,
suggesting that education attained under the Communist system is somewhat less
valuable in the transitionary period. Official government statistics on earnings,
which are summarized in Figure 7, also show fairly stable educational
differentials
19l
• According to these data, earnings increased by between 31% and
37% between 1988 and July 1991, depending on educational level. Workers with
no training experienced the most earnings growth, followed by university graduates.
Second. the already flat experience profiles in East Germany have become slightly
flatter by 1991. We also find very low returns to seniority. Evidently, experience
in the Communist labor market is now of less value. Third, the male-female wage
gap has·narrowed. The labor force participation rate for women in East Germany
fell, moving it in the direction of west German women, but the rate fell by almost
as much for men. Fourth, the explanatory power of the regressions has dropped
considerably, with the R
2 falling from 41% to 28% between 1990 and 1991. Finally,
the residual variance increased by 47% (from .050 to .074) between 1990 and 1991.
These fmdings suggest that there have been major changes in the valuation of
individuals' characteristics since unification.
In other specifications, we have added a dummy variable indicating whether a
wo~ker is on short-time hours, and a dummy indicating white collar status. Workers
on short-time hours earn about 23% less (t-ratio·::: -12) than full-time workers, other
things being equal. This differential is about what one would expect since firms are
required to supplement short-time workers' pay to 85%· to 90% of their previous
level. Including the short-time dummy reduces the return to education slightly and
increases the male-female wage gap by about 4 points.
Interestingly, white collar workers in the east now earn an 11% wage premium
over blue collar workers (t-ratio =6.2). This may be contrasted with the 4% white
collar premium in East Germany in 1988, and the 19% premium in West Germany
in 1988 that we document in Table 3. As far as white collar work is concerned, the
wage structure in east Germany is approaching that in the west. We have also
examined the evolution of industry wage differentials in eastern Germany.
Specifically, we added (broad) industry dummy variables to the wage regressions in
Table 9, and estimated industry wage differentials for East and West Germany. We
greatly affected if these outliers are deleted.
19) The underlying data are from Bielinski, et al. (1991) and our tabulations of the 1988 East
German survey_
23then took deviations of each industry coefficient from the average, assigning a
differential of0 to the omitted industry. To illustrate the evolution ofindustry wage
differentials in eastern Germany. relative to those in western Germany, Figure 8
presents graphs of the east Germany differentials in 1990 or 1991 versus the West
German differentials in 1988
20
). The figures are striking. In 1990 east German
in~ustry wage differentials'were extremely compressed, ranging less than 15% from
highest to lowest paid industry; in West Germany the range was nearly 40%.
Moreover, the correlation between the east and west German industry wage
differentials was statistically insignificant in 1990.
_By 1991, the east German industry wage differentials were far more dispersed,
with a range of 40% between the highest and lowest paid industry. Finance,
insurance and real estate increased its position relative to the mean industry by 25
percentage points, while relative pay in the service industry fell by 10 points.
Moreover, the pattern ofindustry differentials in eastern Germany now more closely
resembles the west German pattern. The rapid change in the eastern inter-industry
wage structure is probably due, in large part, to German unions' success in
negotiating industry-level contracts that follow a similar pattern to western contracts.
D. Easterners Who Work in the West
A small number of eastern Germans surveyed in the SOEP-East migrated to the
west since the initial wave of the survey was conducted
21
). For a sample of 20
migrants we have complete wage and demographic information. An additional 97
s~pled individuals work in the west but live in the east. These 117 easterners who
work in the west have virtually the same level ofeducation as easterners who work
in the east, ~ut are about 8 years younger, are much more likely to be men, are less
likely to hold white collar jobs (37% vs. 53%), and have much lower tenure (.8 vs.
11 years). Bielinski and von Rosenbladt (1991) ,estimate that 28% of commuters
received on-the-job training in a 3 month period in 1991, as compared to 17% of
those who do not commute.
20) We use 1988 West German data because 1991 data are not yet available. The West Germany
industry wage structure is very stable over time, however. For example, we find that between 1988
and 1989 the correlation in the industry differentials for WestGermany was .95. See Helwege and
Wagner (1991) for a comparison of industry wage differentials in the U.S. and West Germany.
21) See Akerlof, et al. (1991) for a landmark study of migration between eastern and western
Germany.
24The average easterner who works in the west earns 2,990 DM per month, which
is 83% more per month than the average for easterners who work in the east; but
about 15% less than the average west German. The relatively small gap in earnings
between easterners who commute or migrated to the west and native west Germans
is noteworthy because the commuters/migrants have extremely low tenure and do not
possess other observable characteristics that are particularly higWy rewarded in the
west German labor markeL_
Column 6 in table 9 presents the estimated log-earnings equation for the small
sample of eastern Germans who work in the west. Although the estimates are
extremely imprecise, they reveal some interesting patterns
ZZ
). First, the return to
education for workers who were educated in the east but work in the west is
relatively large (.065). Although some caution is warranted because ofthe sampling
variance, this fmding nonetheless suggests that the high level of education east
Germans received under the Communist system will receive a reasonable payoff as
the east approaches a western-style market economy. Second, the experience profile
is virtually flat, again suggesting that work experience gained under the Communist
system is of little value. Third, the male-female wage gap is greater for easterners
who work in the west. Finally, the residual variance in earnings is quite close to the
level for West Germany in 1988..
E. Unemployment
An important issue in addition to wage structure changes concerns the evolution
of unemployment in east Germany. Unemployment in east Germany soared after
-unification, as it has in other former East-block countries. The probability ofbeing
unemployed in east Germany is inversely related to education level. We calculate
, that in 1991 the unemployment rate was 6% for university graduates, 2% for master
craftsmen, 10% for workers with apprenticeship training, and 33% for workers with
no post-secondary training. There was hardly any unemployment in 1988 in East
Germany. The unemployment rates by education level in West Germany are much
lower, especially at the low-end of the education distribution. For example,
Abraham and Houseman (1992) find that the unemployment rate in West Germany
for workers with no post-secondary training in 1989 is 11.6%. We also find that the
unemployment rate is almost twice as high for women than men in east Germany
22) In preliminary work, we have found qualitatively similar results for a larger sample of
commuters using data from the 1991 Labor Markets Monitor survey.
25(13% versus 7.6%), and that the probability ofbeing unemployed increases with age.
Ifthe unemployed are very different from the employed in terms of unobserved
characteristics, truncation bias may affect our regression estimates. On the other
hand, this may not be a tremendous problem because much ofthe unemployment is
due to plant closings and mass layoffs, which affect a wide cross-section ofworkers.
Furthermore, we find that the results are qualitatively similar if we estimate the
regressions for eastern Germany using just the subsample of individuals who were
continuously employed between 1989 and 1991. This finding suggests that the
differences in the wage structure that we document between 1989 and 1991 are not
due to the changing composition of the samples.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
We can summarize our main conclusions as follows.
(l)-·-1n,1988the wage structure was more compressed in East Germany than in West
Germany, even though West Germany has low wage variability by U.S.
standards.
(2) In spite ofthe considerable wage compression in East Germany, education was
relatively highly rewarded. Wage differentials based on education were fairly
similar in East and West Germany. Furthermore, East Germans who
migrated to western Germany after the collapse of East Germany appear to
earn a comparable return to their education as native West Germans. Since
East Germans are highly educated, this finding suggests that the unified
Germany will have considerably more human capital.
(3) Average earnings of eastern Germans grew rapidly following unification -- by
as much as 30 to 40 percent. SUlprisingly, this great leap in wages occurred
without unusually highvariability in earnings growth across individuals. The
cross-sectional variance in earnings growth in eastern Germany in 1990-91
was below the typical level for the U.S., but above the typical level for West
Germany.
(4) Wage regressions for 1990 and 1991 already show signs that the East German
wage structure is quite different than it was in 1989. White colar workers in
eastern Germany now earn a substantial premium, although not as large a
26premium as white collar workers earn in the west. Similarly, the industry
wage structure in easternGermany is approaching the WestGerman structure.
The remarkably low level of dispersion in earnings that we documented for
East Germany in 1988 is gradually increasing, primarily because the right-tail
of the distribution is stretching out. In addition, experience profiles have
flattened out, suggesting that work experience gained under the Communist
system is now of little value.
(5) Eastern Germans who are obsetved working in western Germany earn almost
as much as native West Germans, and with the major exception of work
experience, they appearto earn similarpayoffs to theircharacteristics as West
Germans.
(6) The wage structure in eastern Germany, however, still has a long way to go
until it mirrors the wage structure in western Germany. In particular, we
expect that it will be a long time until the experience-earnings profile
becomes as steep in east Germany as it is in west Germany. Although wages
setved mainly a,book-keeping function in the former EastGermany, they now
setve as signals to firms and workers. The impact of the remaining
differences in the wage structures on migration and capital flows between
eastern and western Germany seems to us to be a worthy topic of future
study.
We think the facts documented in this paper are consistent with the view that
German unions and government policies have maintained wages oflow-skill workers
above their current equilibrium level. Unions have imposed a wage structure that
more closely mirrors the western wage structure. Government policy has protected
low-skill workers. The Treuhandanstalt has pursued a policy ofdeliberately seeking
new owners who would maintain employment, and the introduction ofWest German
labor law has made it difficult to layoff workers or to deviate from union contracts.
As a consequence, after unification high-income earners improved their position
relative to middle-income earners, but low-income earners did not lose any ground
relative to middle-income earners. The unemployment rate soared for low.;skill





For the U.S., years of school completed is collected directly in the Current
Population Survey. For East Germany and West Germany, years of schooling must
be inferred from the worker's degree.
Education in our 1988 East German survey is measured in six discrete categories.
The groups are: less than 10th grade, completed 10th grade at a POS, apprenticeship
training, master craftsmen, technical school (Fachschule), ~d university.
Unfortunately, this is a rather coarse grouping; in -particular, secondary school
degrees and post-secondary qualifications are not coded separately. We report results
with four e4ucation dummies as well as for a continuous schooling measure. The
latter measure was constructed as follows. Nine years of schooling were assumed
for workers who did not complete school, ten years if 10th grade were completed.
The first group is rather unimportant and was lumped together with the second in the
dummy variable regressions (this will be the base group). Two years of
apprenticeship training was assumed although a basic allowance is paid during this
time by the employer. Four years of training was assumed for master craftsmen.
Technical school lasts for 3 years and requires completion ofthe EOS or a two year
practical training yielding a total of 15 years of education. Finally, university
co~rses last usually four years beyond EOS, yielding a total of 16. Since the mid
s~venties an additional one ~ear practical training requirement was introduced for
EOS graduates. Thus, we assumed an additional yearofschooling for everyone with
university education who is under age 30.
For the West German survey we have more complete information on educational
attainment. In particular, secondary school degrees and further training are coded
separately. Education categories are formed as follows. Anyone who does not
report any post-secondary training becomes part of the base group. The second
group comprises everybody who completed an apprenticeship, Berufsfachschule, or
schools for public-sector occupations. The third group comprises graduates of
Fachschulen and anyone who reports holding a position as master craftsman. The
next group includes graduates ofFachhochschulenandeveryone who wentto nursing
28school since thIs group has been trained at East Gennan Fachschulen since the
seventies. University graduates fonn the last group.
The continuous schooling measure was constructed using both the infonnation on
the secondary school degree and post-secondary training. For the group with no
post-secondary education the number of years to complete secondary school was
used. Ten years of education were assumed for the category reporting other degrees
(largely special schools) and 9 years for anyone with no secondary degree. For
completed apprenticeship, Berufsfachschule, public-sector training, and nursing
schools two years were added. For gradua~es of Fachschulen 3.5 years were added
since they require a completed apprenticeship and can last for one or two years. We
assumed Fachhochschule to last four years. It can be reached by a variety of
different routes. For graduates with Abitur or Fachhochschulreife 13 and 12 years
of secondary school were used. Por graduates ofHauptschule and Realschule three
years of schooling beyond secondary school were assumed before Fachhochschule
can be entered. Six years ofuniversity training were assumed yielding a total of 19
years for everyone with Abitur. We used 20 years for everyone who does not report
Abitur, since they probably reached university on a more roundabout route, e.g. by
attending Fachhochschule first.
Some of our assumptions may be debatable. For example, it is unclear whether
for a certain degree only the minimum number ofyears necessary should be counted
- or a higher number if a more roundabout route was chosen. HeIberger (1988)
reviews the Gennan literature and discusses these issues in detail without reaching
a clear conclusion.
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33Table 1
Descriptive Statistics with Standard Deviations in Parentheses
a
Variable East Germany West Germany U.S.
(1) (2) (3)
Monthly Earnings
b 1179.14 3814.11 425.54
(359.04) (1798.46) (242.16)
Log Earnings 7.026 8.154 5.914
(0.315) (0.438) (0.527)
Interquartile Range 0.389 0.492 0.751
of Log Earnings
Net Monthly 1970.38 3579.78 334'0.57
Family Income
c (746.20) (2009.90) (1889.06)
Standard Deviation of 0.402 0.421 0.648
Log Family Income
Years of School 13.06 12.32 12.94
(1.78) (2.72) (2.68)
10th Grade or less 0.051 0.137
(0.219) (0.343)
Compi. Apprenticeship 0.594 0.617
(0.491) (0.486)
Master Craftsman 0.056 0.087
(0.229) (0.282)
































a. Data for East Germany are from the 1988 Survey of Blue-and White Collar Households; for
West Germany from the 1988 wave ofthe Socioeconomic Panel; for the U.S. from the March 1989
CPS. Samples consist ofnonagricultural, fulltime employed men and women. For West Germany
and the U.S. self-employed workers are deleted.
b. Earnings refers to gross earnings in the month prior to the interview plus one twelvth ofannual
bonuses for the previous year for the German data sets. For the US, earnings is gross weekly
earnings on the main job.
c. Family income is total net monthly family income for August 1988 plus one twelvth of total
annual income for the previous year for the East German data, formed as the sum of the separate
income categories. For West Germany, it is the answer to the question "What was the net income
of your household last month." For the U.S., it is gross total family income for 1988 divided by
12.Table 2a
Returns to Education: Men and Women
a
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Independent East Germany West Germany U.S.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 5.927 6.717 6.786 7.521 4.494
(0.009) (0.006) (0.040) (0.030) (0.029)
Years of Schooling 0.077 0.077 0.093
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Compl. Apprenticeship 0.139 0.190
(0.005) (0.020)
Master Craftsman 0.274 0.350
(0.007) (0.029)




Experience 0.020 0.019 0.045 0.041 0.032
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Exp.-squared (/100) -0.035 -0.033 -0.077 -0.071 -0.048
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Female -0.234 -0.232 -0.251 -0.250 -0.302
(0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010)
R2 0.414 0.410 0.457 0.432 0.329
(JE 0.241 0.242 0.323 0.331 0.432
Sample Size 43,532 43,532 2,496 2,496 8,118
Note:
a. Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany, and log weekly wage
for U.S. See notes to Table 1 for additonal details on the samples.Table 2b
Returns to Education: Men
a
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Independent East Germany West Germany U.S.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 6.008 6.759 6.767 7.497 4.473
(0.012) (0.009) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037)
Years of Schooling 0.071 0.075 0.085
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
CompI. Apprenticeship 0.106 0.153
(0.008) (0.024)
Master Craftsman 0.226 0.303
(0.009) (0.031)




Experience 0.020 0.019 0.049 0.046 0.042
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Exp.-squared (/100) -0.036 -0.035 -0.083 -0.079 -0.061
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
R
2 0.305 0.300 0.419 0.394 0.310
Sample Size 23,382 23,382 1,778 1,778 4,297
Note:
a. Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany, and log weekly for
the U.S. See notes to Table I for additional details on the samples.Table 2c
Returns to Education: Women
a
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Independent East Germany West Germany U.S.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 5.589 6.448 6.523 7.298 4.177
(0.014) (0.009) (0.083) (0.051) (0.044)
Years of Schooling 0.085 0.082 0.103
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Compi. Apprenticeship 0.162 0.232
(0.008) (0.039)
Master Craftsman 0.357 0.446
(0.016) (0.083)




Experience 0.019 0.019 0.042 0.036 0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Exp.-squared (/100) -0.033 -0.032 -0.075 -0.064 -0.037
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
R 2 0.294 0.292 0.283 0.252 0.270
Sample Size 20,150 20,150 718 718 3,821
Note:
a. Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany, and log weekly wage
for the U.S. See notes to Table I for details on the samples.Table 3
Additonal Earnings Regressions
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Independent East Germany West Germany U.S.
Variable (1) (2) (3) , (4) (5)
Intercept 5.912 5.855 6.770 6.802 4.589
(0.009) (0.011) (0.039) (0.040) (0.029)
Years of 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.069 0.073
Schooling (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience 0.020 0.021 0,942 0.042 0.025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Exp.-sq. (/100) -0.036 -0.038 -0.075 -0.074 -0.040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Female -0.203 -0.195 -0.174 -0.244 -0.220
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
Married 0.009 0.014 0.081 0.075 0.162
(0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014)
Female * married -0.043 -0.044 -0.136 -0.118 -0.175
(0.005) (0.005) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019)








Independent East Germany West Germany U.S.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










Sample size 43,532 43,532 2,496 2,496 8,118
R 2 0.415 0.443 0.462 0.502 0.391
Note:
a. Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany, and log weekly
earnings for the U.S. See notes to Table 1 for further details on the samples.Table 4
Summary of Monthly Earnings ill Eastern Gennany Since 1988







1988 7.03 1,179.1 .30
(.32) (359.0)
1989 7.02 1,182.3 .32
(.37) (382.8)
1990 7.15 1,331.4 .31
(.29) (410.4)
1991 7.35 1,635.2 .35
(.32) (568.9)
Notes:
Data for 1989 have been inflated by 6% to adjust for bonus payments. The average bonus
payment was 6% of total compensation in 1988 and 1990. Workers placed on short-time hours
are included 1989-1991. 1991 figures exclude east Germans who migrated west or commute to
work in the west; if these individuals are included the mean of log earnings is 7.38 and the
standard deviation is .35.Table 5










unemployment 1.1 0.106 0.068 0.4 1.4
New job without
intervening
unemployment 9.6 0.350 0.097 1.9 16.7
Same employer
under new
ownership 5.9 0.240 0.047 0.0 5.0
Changed job
within firm 6.7 0.279 0.038 0.1 4.6
No job
change 76.8 0.228 0.051 0.4 69.8
Total 100.0 0.245 0.056 2.7 97.3
Notes: Data set is SOEP-East. Sample size is 1,443.Table 6
Various Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution
as a Percentage of the Median
Percentile in the Earnings Distribution
A. East Germany
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1988 68.08 82.10 100 121.12 141.91
1989 65.45 81.82 100 118.18 142.73
1990 70.01 83.32 100 120.90 143.84
1991 69.63 82.89 100 - 123.83 159.40
B. West Germany
10th 25th 50th 75th "90th
1984 62.49 79.37 100 129.99 171.00
1985 62.15 79.02 100 130.62 173.44
1986 62.31 78.40 100 130.17 173.94
1987 61.25 77.44 100 130.33 175.94
1988 62.49 78.25 100 129.68 173.08
1989 62.31 79.19 100 130.50 171.88
c. u.s.
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1979 58.00 70.00 100 145.00 200.00
1984 51.54 69.23 100 153.85 215.38
1991 49.31 67.62 100 152.30 225.42
Note:
Data for East Gennany are from the Survey of Blue- and White-Collar Households for 1988 and
from the SOEP-East for 1989-91. 1989 figures for East Gennany exclude bonuses. Data for West
Gennany are from the Socio-Economic Panel. Data for the U.S. are outgoing rotation group files
from the Current Population Survey; earnings refer to usual weekly earnings.Table 7
Transition Matrix by Quintile of the Earnings Distribution
Eastern Germany, 1990-91
Earnings in 1991
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Bottom 0.581 0.210 0.114 0.066 0.028
Earnings Second 0.256 0.369 0.239 0.107 0.031
in Third 0.107 0.234 0.308 0.276 0.072
1990 Fourth 0.045 0.117 0.242 0.314 0.255
Top 0.010 0.069 0.097 0.210 0.614
West Germany, 1988-89
Earnings in 1989
Bottom Second Third Fourth Top
Bottom 0.790 0.167 0.024 0.011 0.007
Earnings Second 0.158 0.625 0.171 0.045 0.000
in Third 0.042 0.181 0.601 0.172 0.004
1988 Fourth 0.007 0.027 0.196 0.650 0.120
Top 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.123 0.869
Notes:
Data are from the Socio-Economic Panels and refer to full-time employed men and women.
Earnings are gross monthly earnings plus 1/12 of annual bonuses.Table 8
Means of Selected Characteristics of Top 10%
and Bottom 90% of Wage Earners, Eastern Germany, 1991
Characteristic Top 10% Bottom 90%
Gross Monthly 2972 1502
Earnings (757) (359)
Percent of Compensation 1.96% 1.59%
due to Bonus
Average Percentile 78.8 46.8
Rank in 1990 Distribution
Earnings Growth 52.2% 25.7%
1990-91 (73.8%) (31.1 %)





Years of Tenure 12.3 10.8
(12.1) (10.4)
Years of Schooling 14.4 12.5
(1.7) (2.2)
Technical School 32.2% 17.5%
University 30.7% 10.1%Characteristic
Table 8 (continued)


























Standard deviations are in parentheses. Except for fIrm size and tenure, the difference between
the top 10% and bottom 90% is statistically significant at the I% level for each characteristic.Table 9
Earnings Equations Before and After Unification
(Standard errors are in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Earnings
Independent East West Eastern Eastern Eastern Easterners
Variable Germany Germany Germany!. Germany Germany in West~
1988 1988 1989 1990 1991 1991
Intercept 5.927 6.786 5.777 6.216 6.481 7.151
(0.009) (0.040) (0.041) (0.032) (0.045) (0.217)
Years of 0.077 0.077 0.074 0.065 0.062 0.065
Schooling (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017)
Experience 0.020 0.045 0.037 0.018 0.014 0.004
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
Exp.-squared -0.035 -0.077 -0.063 -0.028 -0.020 -0.010
(/100) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.037)
Female -0.234 -0.251 -0.224 -0.208 -0.198 -0.389
(0.002) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.084)
R
2 0.414 0.457 0.414 0.410 0.284 0.273
(Je 0.241 0.323 0.286 0.224 0.272 0.355
Sample Size 43,532 2,496 2,213 2,246 1,795 117
Notes:
a. Wages have been inflated by 6% to adjust for bonuses in 1989.
b. Easterners in West includes 20 East Germans who migrated to western Germany, and 97 East Germans
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